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INCOME TAXATION-GIFT AND LEASEBACK SCHEMES
Taxpayer-physician gratuitously transferred to his minor chil-
dren real property consisting of a pharmacy, a rental apartment, and
the offices of taxpayer's medical practice. Subsequently, taxpayer
obtained judicial appointment as legal guardian of the minors, and
by oral arrangement leased the offices from his children. Under sec-
tion 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, taxpayer claimed a business
deduction for the rent which the Internal 'Revenue Service disal-
lowed.' On appeal the Ninth Circuit held, "that the property interest
transferred to the children was sufficient to justify both the deduction
for the donor and taxation of the rental income to the minors."
Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972).
Many courts have refused to give favorable treatment to intra-
family transactions that result in tax bernefits for the participants if
their relative economic positions before and after such transactions
remain substantially the same.2 Such devices as partnerships, 3 corpo-
rations,' straw men, ' step-transactions, or combinations thereof,7
have been used to mask such purposes, but many have been per-
ceived and disallowed.' Donation and leaseback is one such device
and since there is little legislation in this'area, the courts have devel-
oped a federal common law to occupy the vacuum.
For example, since Lucas v. Earl' a mere assignment of income
will not suffice to relieve the assignor from initial tax liability; some
type of ownership in the income-producing property must also be
transferred."' Resolution of gift and leaseback cases has frequently
1. Brooke v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mont. 1968).
2. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1
(1935).
3. Egbert J. Miles, Jr., 41 T.C. 165 (1963).
4. Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1949).
5. Ernest v. Berry, 64,181 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. of Mem. Dec. (1947).
6. Kirschermann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1955); W.H. Armston Co. v.
Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951); Granberg Equip., Inc., 11 T.C. 704 (1948).
7. Ingel Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1949); Egbert J. Miles,
Jr., 41 T.C. 165 (1963).
8. See also Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 380 (1946); Harrison
v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering
v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Note, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 247 (1951); Note, 59 YALE
L.J. 1529 (1950).
9. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
10. The Lucas v. Earl "fruit of the tree" metaphor requires that the tree as well
as the fruits be transferred. But the problems persist: what if only the right to all future
income is assigned? See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). What if a tree laden
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focused on the reality of the original transfer tested by duration and
retained controls, and whether subsequent use of the property or
income is essentially for the donor's benefit." Those cases favorable
to the taxpayer usually involve a donor who has adhered to the
Clifford rules,'" and has insulated himself from retained control by
establishing an independent trustee. 3 Decisions generally adverse to
taxpayers emphasize various mechanisms to maintain control such as
excessive retained interests, continued de facto control by the donor,
use of the donated items for donor's benefit, or failure to adhere to
the Clifford rules.'4
An early attempt to gain tax advantages by gift and leaseback
was thwarted in White v. Fitzpatrick.'5 In White taxpayer donated
patents and cash to his wife whereupon she used the donated funds,
plus some of her own, to buy commercial property suitable for her
donor-husband's business. She then leased the patents and commer-
cial property to him. The Service disallowed rental deductions on the
ground that absence of original business purpose for the donations
negated any subsequent business purpose for rental deductions. The
court agreed with the Service stating "[i]t is now too late to question
with ripened fruit is transferred? See Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.
1945).
11. While commentators have differed in use of descriptive phrases,this seems to
be a fair synopsis. In Brooke the court weighed four factors: (1) the duration of the
transfer; (2) the controls retained by the donor; (3) the use of the transferred property
for the benefit of the donor; and (4) the independence of the trustee. Factors 1, 2 and
4 seem to be covered by the author's first consideration while factor 3 is covered by
the author's second consideration. See also Simmons, Gift and Leaseback Arrange-
ments Involving Property Used in Professional Practice, 48 L.A. BAR. BULL. 62, 63
(1972); Soll, Intra-Family Assignments: Attribution and Realization of Income, 6 TAx
L. REV. 435 (1951); Gibbs, Income Shifting-Recent Trends in Leaseback
Transactions, 19 Sw. L.J. 273 (1965); Note, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 247 (1951); Note, 59
YALE L.J. 1529 (1950).
12. These rules of grantor trusts were set out in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331 (1940), and are now found in sections 671-678 of the Internal Revenue Code. These
sections provide that a grantor will be treated as owner of the trust and thus taxed
with its income when he: (1) retains certain reversionary interests; (2) has power to
determine who enjoys the trust income; (3) controls certain important administrative
functions; and (4) has substantial dominion over the trust corpus or income.
13. See Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1950); Skemp v. Commis-
sioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956); Albert T. Felix,
21 T.C. 794 (1954).
14. See Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965); Kirschenmann
v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1955); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.
1951); Gibbs, Income Shifting-Recent Trends in Leaseback Transactions, 19 Sw. L.J.
273 (1965).
15. 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951).
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the well-established proposition that mere assignment of such a right
will not suffice to insulate the grantor from tax liability under 22(a),
and we think that like tax results must obtain under 23(a)(1)(A).""
A leaseback deduction appears statutorily allowable if the as-
signment effectively shifts income and the rentals paid are reasonable
and necessary in the ordinary course of business. However, possibly
recognizing an avenue of tax avoidance, 7 the court refused to distin-
guish the concept of an assignment of income under section 61 from
a section 162 ordinary and necessary business deduction. Although
the court conceded that the transfer was sufficient to shift income to
the donee under section 61,18 it was insufficient to justify the section
162 deduction because the de facto controls, coupled with the absence
of original transfer business purpose, 9 "render the assignment inef-
fective for federal tax purposes." 0
Prior to White a contrary result obtained in the Third and Sev-
enth Circuits where there was no business purpose in the original
transfer but the donor retained only minimal ownership attributes
and a trust was interposed between donor and donee. In Skemp v.
Commissioner2' and Brown v. Commissioner,"2 the properties were
transferred to trusts with independent trustees and wives as income
beneficiaries; subsequently donor leased back the donated properties
from the trustees. The courts allowed rental deductions finding tax-
payers had irrevocably divested themselves of control over trans-
ferred property. The Skemp court further indicated that taxpayers
had a duty to pay lease rental as the trustees were correlatively bound
to exact the rents "just as much as if the taxpayer had moved across
the street into the property of a third party." 3
16. Id. at 402.
17. The court's language is illustrative of the effort to close tax loopholes: "Assign-
ment and gift cannot be divorced for tax purposes from their accompanying agree-
ments whereby the husband retained dominion .... Gift and retained control must
be regarded as inseparable parts of a single transaction especially since it was only in
their sum total that they had any reality in regard to the conduct of plaintiff's busi-
ness." Id. at 400.
18. "The bare assignment of the patent was legally adequate to transfer all rights
adhering thereto to the wife." Id. at 400.
19. Id. at 401: "[tihe principles governing the intramarital transfer of income
enunciated in Helvering v. Clifford . . . are decisive here . . . . The Clifford rule is
clear that this direct control, when fused with the indirect control which we must imply
from a formal but unsubstantial assignment within a closed family group displaying
no obvious business purpose, renders the assignment ineffective for federal tax pur-
poses.
20. Id. at 401.
21. 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
22. 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1950).
23. 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948).
[Vol. 34
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In White and subsequent cases, the courts seem primarily con-
cerned with degree of control exercisable by the assignor. Where the
settlor retains no reversionary interest, the courts seem satisfied that
the interposition of a trust plus the independence of a trustee pre-
clude residuary dominion by the settlor. However, where no trust is
interposed, donor must establish a business purpose for the original
gift in order to justify the deduction. Later decisions seem to concede
that the purpose of the original transfer is immaterial where the
donor retains no control. 4
A mere formal trust will not protect the taxpayer; the trust in-
strument must not subject the grantor to tax on the trust income
under sections 671-677.21 Taxpayer-settlor must retain no reversion-
ary interest except that permissible under the Clifford rules. Until the
Brooke case, it was also necessary that at least one trustee be some-
one other than the donor to satisfy the independence test,2" although
the settlor could retain some administrative rights or powers over the
trust.? The further requirement that trustees act independently of
the donor was articulated in Audano v. United StatesY.2 There, the
court taxed the trust income to settlor, indicating that failure of the
trustees to act independently in fact could result in disqualification
under grantor trust provisions.
2
1
24. Support for this may be found by close analysis of the court's reasoning pro-
cess. Whenever the formal trust is found, the court next examines the amounts ex-
pended and the type of property rented in light of section 162. It is significant that
the interim step of business purpose behind the initial transfer is not even mentioned
in this situation.
25. The stringent requirements of sections 671-677 coupled with the
jurisprudential prerequisite of an independent trustee make gift-leaseback trusts
among the most circumscribed in tax law. For example, the "independence in fact"
language of Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970) (see text at note 28
infra) is more limited than section 672.
26. See Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970); Van Zandt v.
Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965); Sidney W. Penn, 51 T.C. 144 (1968); Alden
B. Oaks, 44 T.C. 524 (1965); Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954).
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 674. For example, the power to effect the beneficial
enjoyment after expiration of a ten-year period; powers, other than powers of appoint-
ment, exercisable only by will; and power to allocate irrevocably payable beneficial
interests among several charitable beneficiaries will not result in taxability of trust
income to settlor.
28. 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970).
29. Id. at 258. Taxpayer-physician transferred to a trust interests in medical
equipment used in his practice. The trust beneficiaries were his children. Trustees were
the taxpayer, his accountant, and his lawyer. Taxpayer's medical partnership rented
the equipment from the trust under an oral lease-purchase agreement. The original
cost of equipment was less than $15,000; the partnership paid approximately $58,000
in rent over a five-year term; the value of the equipment at the beginning of the rental
was $8,000 to $10,000.
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Brooke seems to recognize guardianships as an alternative device
for insulating the donated leaseback property from the donor's con-
trol and represents the first appellate decision in which a section 162
deduction was allowed where the taxpayer had actual post-transfer
administrative control of the donated property, albeit in a fiduciary
capacity. Even though guardianship was deemed sufficient to satisfy
the requirement of independent management, 0 the court appeared
reluctant to base the decision on this ground alone. The court noted
that the "non-tax motives, as borne out by the record, are abundant
and grounded in economic reality."3 Under Montana law, state court
control of legal guardianship was deemed substantially equivalent to
both trust and trustee.32 Despite the absence of a formal trust the
original transfer was not subjected to the business purpose test and
only business purpose at the time of rental payments was necessary.
While Brooke seems to invite new forays into income assignment
via the intra-family gift and leaseback, the careful planner will recog-
nize the hazards involved. First, successful attack by the Service may
result in effective double taxation of the rental income.33 Second, the
decision itself can easily be distinguished or limited to an alternative
rationale in support of the holding.34 Third, even if the planner is
30. The court isolated from prior cases four factors to consider in gift-leaseback
situations: "(1) the duration of the transfer; (2) the controls retained by the donor; (3)
the use of the gift property for the benefit of the donor and; (4) the independence of
the trustee." As to the first the court said "No issue is presented here as to the duration
of the transfer-it was absolute and irrevocable, it was by warranty deed, uncondi-
tioned and unencumbered." The court next stated that "[tihe taxpayer in this in-
stance has retained few, if any controls over the trust property." Factor three was
disposed of summarily: "It is also apparent that trust benefits have not inured to the
taxpayer as donor." After analyzing Montana law the court resolved the final issue in
favor of taxpayer stating, "[a] court appointed trustee-even though the
taxpayer-offers sufficient independence." Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155,
1157 (9th Cir. 1972).
31. Id. at 1158. Note, however, that while business purpose was not required, the
court found that the transactions were such that "In]either substance nor impact
denies this transfer professional or economic reality." This "grounded in substantial
economic reality language" appears also in Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 406
(2d Cir. 1957), Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965), and Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794
(1954), and seemingly is just a modification of the rules that a transfer solely to avoid
taxes will not be recognized whereas mere benefit to the taxpayer alone is not fatal.
32. 468 F.2d at 1158.
33. This occurs when the reallocation of income is allowed under section 61 but
the corresponding rental deduction is disallowed. The rental income is thus twice
taxed-once to the donor and again, albeit in a lower bracket, to the donee. See
Simmons, Gift and Leaseback Arrangements Involving Property Used in a Professional
Practice, 48 L.A. BAR BULL. 62, 63 (1972).
34. "The non-tax motives, as borne out by the record, are abundant and grounded
in economic reality." 468 F.2d at 1158. See note 31 supra.
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able, by revenue ruling or otherwise, to ascertain the effect of state
law in this area, any change in that law could be fatal.
In Louisiana, a minor's property may be administered by the
minor himself,35 a tutor,3" a trustee, 37 his parent,38 or a custodian. 31
There is no positive law authorizing the appointment of a parent as
a tutor of his child during the existence of parental authority;" how-
ever, the father, as the administrator of the child's property, is ac-
countable for both the revenues and property 'during minority.'
Thus, if a father were to donate property to his child without express
reservation of the usufruct" his position as administrator of that
property might be the equivalent of the Brooke guardianship. After
dissolution of the marriage, or upon separation from bed and board
the parental authority ceases 3 and the minor is placed under author-
ity of a tutor44 who administers the minor's property. If the natural
tutor donated property to the child without express reservation of the
usufruct, the tutor seemingly could benefit from Brooke . 5 If, as is
often the case, the mother is awarded custody, she can accept the
parental usufruct and refuse the tutorship,4" possibly allowing the
father 7 to qualify as tutor and capitalize on Brooke.18
Even assuming that a parent could be a tutor or administrator
without the right of usufruct over the particular property involved,
the continuing obligation of the parents to support minor children
35. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1785; Pascal, Contracts of a Minor or His Representative
Under the Louisiana Civil Code, 8 LA. L. REV. 383 (1940).
36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 246.
37. LA. R.S. 9:1791-2212 (1950).
38. LA. CiV. CODE art. 221.
39. Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, LA. R.S. 9:735-42 (Supp. 1961).
40. Control and use of a minor's property during parental authority is discussed
in Nelson, Administration of a Minor's Property in Louisiana Under Paternal
Authority, 22 LA. L. REV. 615 (1962). See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4361-63 (for an exception
when parent and child hold property in common and wish to partition. These articles
replaced Civil Code articles 343 and 344).
41. LA. CIV. CODE art. 221, 226.
42. LA. Civ. CODE art. 226 provides in part: "Neither shall such usufruct extend
to such estate as is given the children by donation inter vivos by either the father or
mother unless . . . the right to such usufruct has been reserved .... " (Emphasis
added.) Since the parent is fully accountable for this property, an argument may be
made that the theory in Brooke is available.
43. LA. CIv. CODE art. 221.
44. Id. art. 246.
45. Id. arts. 225, 226.
46. Id. art. 253.
47. Id. art. 301. The father may not refuse the tutorship of his own children.
48. See note 42 supra.
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may create new difficulties with respect to section 677 of the Internal
Revenue Code." Section 677 (b) penalizes the settlor in situations
where trust income is utilized to discharge his obligations by includ-
ing and taxing such sums in the settlor's return. The court in Brooke
discussed this issue and resolved it in favor of settlor-donor, finding
that under Montana law the use of rental income was in fact for
purposes other than legally enforceable support obligations of donor.5 0
It can be seen that application of Brooke may result in inequita-
ble taxpayer treatment depending upon idiosyncrasies of state law."
This type of discrimination, which both Congress and the courts con-
tinually strive to eliminate, combined with the spectre of tax avoid-
ance, bodes ill for reliance upon Brooke.
James R. Raborn
CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND THE COMMUNITY OF GAINS
Mr. Creech endorsed a promissory note given to his divorced wife
by Capitol Mack, Inc. in payment for the purchase of stock she had
acquired in the partition of the community of gains. Creech remarried
and subsequently both Capitol Mack and Creech defaulted on this
note. In a suit by Creech's first wife, the Louisiana supreme court
overruled United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Green' and held
that the husband's antenuptial creditor may enforce his right by
execution against those assets of the husband forming part of the
community of gains of the second marriage. Creech v. Capitol Mack,
Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973).
At first glance, the court's decision is in apparent conflict with
the literal language of Louisiana Civil Code article 2403:
In the same manner, the debts contracted during the marriage
enter into the partnership or community of gains, and must be
acquitted out of the common fund, whilst the debts of both hus-
band and wife, anterior to the marriage, must be acquitted out
of their own personal and individual effects.
This article has been subjected to varying constructions for over a
century. Prior to Green, virtually all the decisions indicated that the
49. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 227. The third factor used by the Brooke court in testing
the gift-leaseback was "use of the donated property for the donor's benefit." Brooke
v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1972).
50. 468 F.2d at 1158.
51. A primary example was the passage of an income splitting provision in 1948
to equalize tax treatment of spouses without community property regimes with those
in states such as Louisiana where income splitting between spouses is accomplished
by local law.
1. 252 La. 227, 210 So. 2d 328 (1968).
[Vol. 34
